



GENDER EQUALITY AND INDIGENOUS 
PEOPLES’ RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION 
AND CULTURE 
MARIA NOEL LEONI ZARDO 
I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................... 1053 
II. INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ RIGHT TO SELF-
DETERMINATION AND THE COLLECTIVE RIGHT TO 
CULTURE ............................................................................... 1059 
A. THE IMPORTANCE OF RECOGNIZING COLLECTIVE RIGHTS 
OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES .................................................... 1059 
B. THE SCOPE OF THE COLLECTIVE RIGHTS  TO SELF-
DETERMINATION AND CULTURE ......................................... 1068 
III. ADDRESSING GENDER INEQUALITY  WITHIN 
INDIGENOUS COMMUNITIES ........................................... 1073 
IV. CONCLUSION ....................................................................... 1088 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Let us begin by imagining a community that identifies itself as 
indigenous and calls itself Sukiris. The Sukiris have lived in the 
Sukiry jungle long before it came to be part of the territory of the 
State of Palamor, a constitutional democracy in Latin America that 
ratified all the main human rights treaties in the universal and 
regional system. In general, the Sukiris are able to enjoy and transmit 
their culture, as well as to decide over their affairs in an autonomous 
manner. In this sense, Palamor recognizes the Sukiris as Indigenous 
Peoples, and its constitution incorporates the fundamental principles 
established in the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(the “Declaration”),1 particularly the right to self-determination. 
 
 1. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 
61/295, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Oct. 2, 2007) [hereinafter Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples]. 
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Consequently, the Sukiris have a constitutionally recognized 
property right over their territories and natural resources and a right 
to benefit from them economically. Moreover, the Palamorese 
government is very respectful of its obligation to consult the Sukiris’ 
authority before initiating development projects that may affect their 
territories and is conscious of sharing the benefits. Lastly, the Sukiris 
have permanent representatives in the national government and 
congress, and a special procedure allows the Sukiris to object to any 
law, policy, or regulation that could interfere with their cultural 
practices.  
As a consequence of this political arrangement, the Sukiris’ 
culture has thrived, allowing the Sukiris to develop a sustainable 
economy that allows their small community to enjoy their traditions 
and basic human rights as a collective, while concurrently enjoying 
individual rights as full citizens of Palamor.  
This story, however, seems unlikely. Indigenous communities 
around the world are threatened by extinction, and their members are 
among the poorest and most marginalized integrants of our societies. 
Governments have long believed that by implementing inclusive 
policies, indigenous communities would gradually assimilate to the 
larger societies and cultures surrounding them, highlighting that such 
inclusive policies are good for Indigenous Peoples.2 The 
consequence has been decades of neglect and discriminatory 
practices toward indigenous traditions, cultures, and demands, 
particularly toward the most important demand of all: Indigenous 
Peoples have the right of non-accommodation. Yet, the Sukiris’ story 
may not be that hard to imagine because it likely represents the 
answering of many Indigenous Peoples’ demands. It represents the 
goal of the very important set of international norms that the 
international community has adopted and that are enforced by 
international mechanisms. Thus, if the Sukiris’ situation were 
extended to the different indigenous communities around the world, 
the international community would likely say that the situation is 
close to ideal. This essay poses the argument, however, that the 
 
 2. See Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Indigenous Rights: Some Conceptual Problems, 
in CONSTRUCTING DEMOCRACY: HUMAN RIGHTS, CITIZENSHIP, AND SOCIETY IN 
LATIN AMERICA 141, 144 (Elizabeth Jelin & Eric Hershberg eds., 1996) 
(explaining that governments have raised concerns about the consequences of non-
assimilation and its effect on “national unity and development”). 
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international community’s “ideal” situation for indigenous 
communities still lacks fundamental protections for individuals 
within the indigenous communities. It argues that while the 
international legal framework is appropriately designed to address 
the rights of indigenous communities and their individual members 
vis-à-vis the State and the larger society, it fails to address situations 
of gender inequality within the community. The right to self-
determination, as it is currently applied to indigenous communities, 
can serve as a perpetuation of certain cultural practices that inhibit 
indigenous women from enjoying equal rights to their male 
counterparts.3 To demonstrate, let us revisit the Sukiris’ almost ideal 
situation, but this time let us look inside the community. First, by 
ancestral law, the Sukiri Council, the body in charge of making the 
most important political decisions for the indigenous community, can 
only be comprised of male members, which is also true for the 
representatives of the community that can be elected to the national 
government. Although this practice could be challenged under 
Palamor’s Constitution, no female member of the community would 
contravene Sukiri traditions. Second, the tradition for Sukiris is for 
men to leave the community to work while women stay at home to 
take care of the household and children. In this tradition, if a woman 
wants to receive an education or go outside the community, she 
needs permission from her husband who is often working far away. 
Thus, Sukiri women and girls are less likely than men to get an 
education or go outside the community. Lastly, according to 
tradition, menstruation makes women dirty and evil and, therefore, 
while a Sukiri woman is menstruating she is not supposed to leave 
the house. During this time, girls do not go to school and women do 
not work. As a result, Sukiri girls fall behind in their education and 
Sukiri women earn less money than the men. 
These hypotheticals do not apply to every indigenous community, 
but they are not that unlikely since most of them are real examples of 
 
 3. See Alexandra Xanthaki, The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples and Collective Rights: What’s the Future for Indigenous Women?, in 
REFLECTIONS ON THE UN DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 
413, 420–21 (Stephen Allen & Alexandra Xanthaki eds., 2011) (emphasizing the 
peculiar role of indigenous women, who often bear the responsibility of 
maintaining the indigenous group’s culture but also are subject to the same 
discriminations of non-indigenous women). 
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practices taken from a study conducted by an indigenous women’s 
organization to detect gender inequality in indigenous communities 
in Suriname.4 The argument of this paper is, therefore, not based on a 
general negative perception of indigenous cultural practices toward 
women, but rather on the fact that, if there is something that history 
has shown us, it is that, with different justifications and through 
different patterns, gender inequality has been a constant 
manifestation of different cultures.5 There is no reliable indication 
that indigenous cultures are exceptions to this gender inequality 
pattern, either because some of their cultural practices may not be 
egalitarian from a gender perspective, or because they have become 
less gender egalitarian as a consequence of the interaction with the 
larger society.6 Indeed, the International Work Group for Indigenous 
Affairs (“IWGIA”) recognizes that promoting gender equality among 
Indigenous Peoples can pose significant challenges since gender 
equality and customary laws often collide.7 And this challenge lays 
 
 4. See SANOMARO ESA, INDIGENOUS RIGHTS, WOMEN AND EMPOWERMENT IN 
SURINAME 66, 70 (Ellen-Rose Kambel ed., 1999). 
 5. See U.N. Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and 
Consequences, 15 Years of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Violence 
Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences (1994–2009) – A Critical Review, 
Human Rights Council, 39, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/11/6/Add.5 (May 27, 2009) 
(“Culture-based identity politics has been considered by the mandate holders to 
pose one of the most serious challenges to women’s human rights. They have 
addressed challenges arising from cultural relativist assertions that reject 
universality of human rights, particularly with regard to women’s equality, as well 
as cultural essentialist approaches that view some cultures as being inherently 
misogynist.”). 
 6. See, e.g., Editorial, Kathrin Wessendorf, INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS, no. 1–2, 
2004, at 4 (“Many indigenous women now find themselves confronted with 
unequal conditions imposed by the dominant society and subsequently taken up by 
their own communities. In Sápmi, the influence of the majority society on 
indigenous culture has led to the man’s role becoming that of ‘bread winner,’ while 
the woman’s role is now confined to the home. Whereas the traditional ideal is that 
women and men are equal, the reality in current Sami society is different.”). 
 7. See INT’L WORK GRP. FOR INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS, POSITION PAPER AND 
STRATEGY: GENDER AND INDIGENOUS WOMEN (1999) [hereinafter GENDER AND 
INDIGENOUS WOMEN], available at http://www.iwgia.org/images/stories/sections/ 
about-iwgia/documents/strategy-papers/Genderstrategy.pdf (noting that within 
indigenous communities there are traditions that may contradict fundamental rights 
of gender equality and that the organization struggles to achieve both indigenous 
rights and gender equality); see also Stavenhagen, Indigenous Rights: Some 
Conceptual Problems, supra note 2, at 152 (“ [T]here are instances in which the 
rights of a community to the preservation of customs and traditions can mean the 
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mainly on the fact that it is the right of Indigenous Peoples to self-
determine their way of life, which international human rights mostly 
aims to guarantee, and an attempt to judge this culture with concepts 
of gender equality that might be foreign to that self-determination 
process may be categorized as an intrusion. The challenge is further 
aggravated when acknowledging that indigenous communities are 
seriously threatened by extinction. Therefore, any argument on 
gender equality may appear of secondary importance; what matters 
first is survival.8 
The purpose of this paper is to explore this challenge and attempt 
to increase the importance and urgency of addressing gender 
inequalities within indigenous communities. It will argue that 
Indigenous Peoples’ rights should not be applied with a gender-
neutral lens.9 Even though some may question these considerations 
as being a foreign imposition on indigenous culture, this paper will 
argue that a directive of human rights is to homogenize a minimum 
standard of respect for every human being. Therefore, the minimum 
standards of gender equality we conceive of as fundamental in the 
international community should be enforced with the same strength 
within the cultural practices of any indigenous community. This 
issue is often addressed by stating that when individual rights—in 
this case, women’s right not to be discriminated against—are in 
conflict with collective rights—in this case cultural rights and self-
determination—individual rights trump collective ones.10 Hence, the 
individual rights of women affected by discriminatory cultural 
practices would be safeguarded. This approach, however, is not 
considerate of the right to self-determination of Indigenous Peoples.11 
 
reduction or violation of the individual rights of some of its members.”). 
 8. See Xanthaki, supra note 3, at 421 (“[T]he negative impact of some 
indigenous practices and stereotypes on indigenous women has been seen as a 
taboo by some indigenous activists and scholars; as Radcliffe confirms ‘gender 
issues remain secondary to the cultural politics of the indigenous movements, 
where the persistence of a complimentary dual model of gender underpins a 
tradition and symbolic role for indigenous women.”). 
 9. See id. at 420 (noting that scholars have yet to examine in depth the 
relationship between increased collective rights for indigenous groups and 
oppression of the rights of women within their indigenous groups). 
 10. See id. at 428–29 (discussing the general view that individual rights trump 
collective rights, and noting arguments that individual rights should be applied in 
context-specific cases). 
 11. See id. at 430–31 (explaining that UN bodies take the position that a 
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Thus, this essay argues for an alternative interpretation that is fully 
respectful of Indigenous Peoples’ autonomy and analyzes the right to 
self-determination in a way that is inclusive of gender equality.12 
The issue is very delicate and not suitable for general conclusions. 
Each case demands a tailored solution because it is a case of human 
rights limits. But this is not a reason not to incorporate a 
comprehensive gender perspective in all indigenous affairs 
discussions. At a minimum, the discussion is instrumental to defining 
what Indigenous Peoples’ rights are about, and at the same time 
defining what we expect from enforcing human rights. Additionally, 
because, more often than not, gender inequality issues are less visible 
or urgent than other more “public” concerns,13 and chances are that 
this may be another case since, in fact, the Declaration is mostly 
silent about guaranteeing gender equality.14 
The scope of this paper has three qualifications. First, it does not 
claim that all indigenous cultural practices are gender biased, or even 
that it is a general reality. Second, it does not assume that historical 
or social grounds for unequal practices that may exist in an 
indigenous community are the same as western societies, since 
indigenous cultural practices may not rely on western values and 
stereotypes. Rather, the concern is whether or not practices lead to 
unequal opportunities for women to exercise equal rights to men. 
Lastly, this paper concentrates on cultural practices that do not 
constitute crimes under domestic law. It is regarding these non-
violent, gender-biased practices that make it harder to achieve a 
balance between self-determination, cultural rights, and gender 
equality.  
 
community right does not trump an individual right). 
 12. See ESA, supra note 4, at 13–15 (describing the Women’s Empowerment 
Approach and advocating that the indigenous women should be able to exercise the 
right to self-determination on an equal footing with men). 
 13. See, e.g., Elizabeth Jelin, Women, Gender, and Human Rights, in 
CONSTRUCTING DEMOCRACY: HUMAN RIGHTS, CITIZENSHIP, AND SOCIETY IN 
LATIN AMERICA 177, 181 (Elizabeth Jelin & Eric Hershberg eds., 1996) (noting 
that a key turning point in gender equality was valuing the work that women did in 
the homes out of the public eye); see also Susan Miller Okin, Feminism and 
Multiculturalism, 108 ETHICS 661, 664 (1998). 
 14. See Xanthaki, supra note 3, at 422 (stating that although Article 44 of the 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples expressly states that there are to 
be equal rights for men and women of indigenous groups, there was little 
discussion as to how the article would apply). 
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II. INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ RIGHT TO  
SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE COLLECTIVE 
RIGHT TO CULTURE 
As expressed above, this essay explores whether international 
human rights law, by recognizing Indigenous Peoples’ right to self-
determination, lends protection to certain indigenous cultural 
practices that result in illegitimate gender inequalities. The issue 
presents a conflict between the collective right to self-determination 
and culture and the individual rights of indigenous women. This 
section will attempt to define the scope of those rights before 
exploring the conflict.  
A. THE IMPORTANCE OF RECOGNIZING COLLECTIVE RIGHTS OF 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 
In 2007 the UN General Assembly approved the Declaration that 
expressly recognizes Indigenous Peoples’ right to self-determination. 
Granting Indigenous Peoples the right to self-determination means 
that Indigenous Peoples have the right, as a collective, to “freely 
determine their political status and pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development.”15 Furthermore, the Declaration recognizes 
that Indigenous Peoples have a collective right to own and benefit 
from their land and resources,16 and to promote and develop their 
culture.17 However, neither the recognition of indigenous 
communities as “peoples,” nor their corresponding right to self-
determination or the recognition of collective rights remains 
unchallenged. Thus, it is important to express the reasons why this 
paper frames the issue under the recognition of collective rights to 
 
 15. See Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 1, art. 3. 
 16. See id. arts. 26–27 (providing in part that respect will be given to the 
customary and traditional land system of the indigenous peoples involved in 
determining land rights recognized by the State). 
 17. See id. art. 5 (“right to maintain and strengthen their distinct political, legal, 
economic, social and cultural institutions”); id. art. 8 (“right not to be subjected to 
forced assimilation or destruction of their culture”); id. art. 11 (“right to practise 
and revitalize their cultural traditions”); id. art. 12 (“right to manifest, practice, 
develop and teach their spiritual and religious traditions”); id. art. 13 (“right to 
revitalize, use, develop and transmit to future generations their histories, 
languages, oral traditions, philosophies, writing systems and literatures”); id. art. 
14 (“right to establish and control their educational systems and institutions 
providing education in their own languages”). 
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Indigenous Peoples. In fact, the Declaration is not a binding 
instrument, and it is, therefore, disputed whether the Declaration 
creates any special obligation on the State toward Indigenous 
Peoples.18 Defining this is important because, although many argue 
that the Declaration is merely a restatement of previously recognized 
rights, applied through the particular lens of Indigenous Peoples’ 
situation,19 others assert that it represents a change in international 
law since it recognizes a non-state actor with sovereign rights.20 
Hence, the novelty of the Declaration is mainly the recognition of the 
right to self-determination. Self-determination arguably gives a 
different context to collective rights that have, indeed, been 
recognized before, for several groups of people, and not exclusively 
to Indigenous Peoples.21  
The interplay between the right to self-determination, the 
collective right to culture, and the individual rights of members of 
the community is what lends significant complexity to the issue of 
how human rights law should deal with gender discrimination within 
indigenous communities. This interplay of rights raises questions 
such as: Do the individual rights of the Sukiri women not to be 
discriminated against on the basis of gender trump the collective 
right to culture of the Sukiris? But if this is true, what is then the 
 
 18. See, e.g., Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Making the Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples Work: The Challenges Ahead, in REFLECTIONS ON THE UN 
DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, supra note 3, at 147, 151 
(“At best, the Declaration is considered to be soft law which can be ignored at will, 
particularly as it does not include enforcement mechanisms. 
 19. Stavenhagen, supra note 2, at 150; see Stephen Allen, The UN Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the Limits of the International Legal 
Project, in REFLECTIONS ON THE UN DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, supra note 3, at 225, 236 (explaining that indigenous 
representatives argue that the Declaration is an interpretation of old rights rather 
than a creation of new rights). 
 20. See id. at 236 (noting that the claim that the Declaration does not create 
new rights is an “unusual tactic”); see also H. Patrick Glenn, The Three Ironies of 
the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, in REFLECTIONS ON THE 
UN DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, supra note 3, at 171, 
174 (describing the Declaration as a “major shift” for international law because its 
openness to non-state actors is “humanizing”). 
 21. See Allen, supra note 19, at 237–38 (distinguishing between the collective 
rights of indigenous communities from those of other groups, such as minorities, 
focusing on the unique right to self-determination that is provided exclusively to 
indigenous communities). 
  
2013] GENDER EQUALITY AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 1061 
purpose of a right to self-governance? Isn’t it implicit that self-
determination means that some common goals of the community can 
be validly pursued, and that this can legitimize the imposition of 
some limits on individual rights? And, what are the obligations of the 
State towards Sukiri women’s rights, versus its obligations to the 
Sukiri Indigenous Peoples rights overall? How are individual rights 
and collective rights compatible? The complexity of these issues, 
coupled with governmental fear that recognizing collective rights 
would undermine the State and individual rights, or that recognizing 
Indigenous Peoples’ right to self-determination can lead to their 
secession, explain the many popular theories that attempt to deal 
with the right to culture and the protection of ethnic groups without 
considering collective rights.22 And these theories are largely 
consistent with the classic liberal approach to human rights that is 
based on individualism and universality, and does not include 
collective rights.23  
In this sense, even when the majority of human rights were 
initially conceived to protect collective interests, the classic human 
rights system is based on the idea that it is the individual, and not the 
group, that holds rights.24 Individuals have human rights vis-à-vis the 
State, which is the only human association that public international 
law recognizes as a sovereign legal subject (along with the 
exceptional recognition of colonial regimes).25 To that end, human 
rights are the approved means of resistance of the individual against 
the State.26 Under this understanding, groups of individuals can have 
 
 22. See, e.g., DWIGHT NEWMAN, COMMUNITY AND COLLECTIVE RIGHTS: A 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR RIGHTS HELD BY GROUPS 6–7 (2011) (describing 
Will Kymlicka’s approach to collective rights, which focuses on individual rights 
within the group rather than the collective whole, and the scholarship that followed 
his approach). 
 23. See WIKTOR OSIATYNSKI, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THEIR LIMITS 86 (2009) 
(describing the classic theory that groups cannot claim human rights, but rather 
individuals can claim them); see also Stavenhagen, Indigenous Rights: Some 
Conceptual Problems, supra note 2, at 151 (noting that, according to the classic 
theory, groups may have other rights, but they cannot be the subject of human 
rights). 
 24. See OSIATYNSKI, supra note 23; see also Stavenhagen, Indigenous Rights: 
Some Conceptual Problems, supra note 2, at 151. 
 25. See Glenn, supra note 20, at 176 (stating that human rights are the sole 
approved means of resistance to the State). 
 26. See id. (characterizing the rights provided through the Declaration as a 
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rights, even constitutional rights, but they cannot have human rights 
that can be invoked against the State or the group’s members.27 This 
framework does not mean, however, that the classic approach to 
human rights ignores the essential social nature of human life. Most 
individual human rights, be they freedom of association or freedom 
of religion, are designed to be exercised as part of a collective.28 
Moreover, the classic approach is not blind to the fact that some 
individuals, because they belong to ethnic groups or other minorities, 
are in a more vulnerable position in society that often leads to 
discrimination. For this reason, Article 27 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) enshrines the right 
of members of ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities to enjoy their 
culture with other members of the group, to profess and practice their 
religion, and to use their native language.29 This principle is also 
developed in many other binding instruments.30 However, the 
recognition of collective identity in these instruments does not 
connote the group as a rights holder and, therefore, does not entail an 
express recognition of a collective right to self-determination or 
 
means of empowerment for individuals against the State). 
 27. See Stavenhagen, Indigenous Rights: Some Conceptual Problems, supra 
note 2, at 151 (noting that however a group is characterized, the group does not 
have human rights, rather it is the individuals within the group that hold those 
rights). 
 28. See id. (emphasizing that many protected rights can “only” be exercised in 
groups and not by individuals alone). 
 29. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 27, Dec. 19, 1966, 
999 U.N.T.S. 171, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95–20 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 30. See, e.g., Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 30, Nov. 20, 1989, 
1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (providing that “a child . . . who is indigenous shall not be denied 
the right, in community with other members of his or her group, to enjoy his or her 
own culture, to profess and practice his or her own religion, or to use his or her 
own language”); see also Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women art. 1, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 
[hereinafter CEDAW] (proclaiming that women shall have equal rights and access 
to enjoy their human rights and fundamental freedoms); International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 3, S. 
Treaty Doc. No. 95–19 [hereinafter ICESCR] (stating that all individuals have a 
right to self-determination, including the ability to exercise their economic, social, 
and cultural development); International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination art. 1, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 
(denouncing racial discrimination and defining racial discrimination as including 
the denial of rights to freely practice political, social, economic, and cultural 
freedoms). 
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culture.31 The underlying presumption by some commentators is that 
individual rights are sufficient to enhance the development of the 
group.32 
Yet, experience has made it increasingly evident that the members 
of determined social groups cannot enjoy their individual rights of 
equality unless their collective identities are recognized, respected, 
and protected. Indigenous communities are a key example of this 
case. As a consequence, even though the right to culture is universal, 
the right became especially relevant to advance the struggle for 
recognition of ethnic and minority groups, thus leading to many 
multiculturalistic theories.33 But most of these theories are still 
constructed based on the liberal conception of human rights that 
denies collective rights. Although it could be argued that, at least 
with respect to indigenous communities, these theories are set aside 
by the Declaration that recognizes collective rights,34 they should still 
be examined because they continue to give credence to the idea that, 
even if collective rights are recognized, when a conflict arises, 
individual rights should always prevail.  
A popular exponent of these liberal theories of multiculturalism is 
Will Kymlicka. He argues that members of ethnic and indigenous 
communities have “group-differentiated rights,” which are special 
rights that emanate from the membership to the group and that create 
special obligations upon the State to protect that membership and the 
group.35 However, despite emanating from membership, these special 
rights are individual rights, not collective rights. The existence of 
these rights derives from the recognition that members of these 
groups face several inequalities because of their identification with 
 
 31. Cf. Joshua Castellino, Indigenous Rights and the Right to Development, in 
REFLECTIONS ON THE UN DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, 
supra note 3, at 367, 371–72. 
 32. See Xanthaki, supra note 3, at 428–29. 
 33. See JURGEN HABERMAS, THE INCLUSION OF THE OTHER: STUDIES IN 
POLITICAL THEORY 206 (1999); see also Stavenhagen, Indigenous Rights: Some 
Conceptual Problems, supra note 2, at 151. 
 34. See Xanthaki, supra note 3, at 415 (noting that arguments against collective 
rights were put aside with the passing of the Declaration, but arguing that 
collective rights existed prior to the Declaration). 
 35. See WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY 
OF MINORITY RIGHTS 35 (1995) (distinguishing between collective rights and 
group-differentiated citizenship because the term collective rights erroneously 
assumes conflict with individual rights). 
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the group, and that these inequalities affect their capacity to enjoy 
their individual rights on equal footing with other members of 
society.36 Hence, in order to ensure equality, the State has an 
obligation to protect the group and its cultural practices.37 However, 
this protection exists only as long as it is consistent with the 
advancement of the individual rights of the members of the group.38 
At the same time, because Kymlicka does not recognize collective 
rights, he rejects that the group can curtail the rights of its members 
to advance the rights of the group.39  
Thus, a theory like that of Kymlicka’s could easily provide a 
solution to our issue of gender inequality in indigenous communities. 
As applied to the Sukiris’ case, we could assume that the Sukiris’ 
cultural practices that undermine women would be illegitimate 
because they represent restrictions on individual rights imposed by 
the group, and that, at the same time, the Palamorese government 
could freely interfere to eradicate these practices because its 
obligation of protection only extends to those cases that promote 
individual rights.40 The aim of this essay is to uphold the individual 
rights of indigenous women while, at the same time, supporting 
collective rights of indigenous communities. As Alexandra Xanthaki 
states:  
[I]nsisting on an individualistic system of protection for indigenous 
peoples merely on the basis that collective rights do not fit with a 
prescribed version of liberalism would ignore the needs of these 
communities all over the world for the sake of intellectual coherence. It 
would mean submitting human rights to the oppression of a western 
jurisprudential viewpoint.41 
Indigenous Peoples’ collective right to self-determination and 
 
 36. See NEWMAN, supra note 22, at 14 (referring to Kymlicka’s theory of 
minority rights). 
 37. KYMLICKA, supra note 35, at 44 (discussing different ways to protect 
historical customs wherein limitations are placed “on the basic civil liberties of [a 
group’s] members”). 
 38. Id. 
 39. See id. at 34–35. 
 40. See OSIATYNSKI, supra note 23, at 90 (referring to Kymlicka’s argument 
that illiberal practices by cultural groups are not only bad, but intolerable and that, 
therefore, the larger society has a right to intervene and stop them). 
 41. Xanthaki, supra note 3, at 417. 
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culture are essential legal and moral standards that should be 
recognized as binding. They should be binding not only because they 
were included in the Declaration approved by 143 member States to 
the UN, but also because Indigenous Peoples’ collective right to self-
determination and culture have been long present in international 
human rights law.  
To start, the whole theory of individual human rights rests on a 
fundamental right that belongs to “all peoples” and that is, therefore, 
inherently collective; this right is namely, the right to self-
determination.42 Even when this right has been historically reserved 
for the aggregate population of a State, to cases of colonial regimes 
or other exceptional circumstances,43 it is defined more broadly, as 
the prerogative of all peoples to freely determine their political status 
and pursue their economic, social, and cultural development.44 
Without this right the whole system of human rights would lack 
coherence because the main understanding behind the system is that 
all human beings, both as individuals and as groups, have the 
autonomy to freely and equally pursue their own paths.45 In 
recognition of this idea, even before the Declaration was approved, 
the Human Rights Committee (“HRC”) had already stated that the 
right to self-determination, enshrined in Article 1 of the ICCPR, 
applies to Indigenous Peoples.46 Similarly, the HRC interpreted the 
right to culture recognized in Article 27 of the ICCPR, when applied 
 
 42. See S. James Anaya, Self Determination as a Collective Human Right 
Under Contemporary International Law, in OPERATIONALIZING THE RIGHT OF 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES TO SELF-DETERMINATION 4 (Pekka Aikio & Martin Scheinin 
eds., 2000) (describing that the right to self-determination is for all “people,” but 
noting that the definition of “people” is hotly debated). 
 43. See id. at 5; see also Stavenhagen, Making the Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples Work: The Challenges Ahead, supra note 18, at 162. 
 44. See ICCPR, supra note 29, art. 1; ICESCR, supra note 30, art. 1; U.N. 
Charter art. 1.2. The right to self-determination is enshrined in article 1.2 of the 
UN Charter, and articles 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
 45. Anaya, supra note 42, at 8; see also NEWMAN, supra note 22, at 122 
(affirming that autonomy itself is an ideal that would be “pointless . . . if it were all 
that mattered” and we could not use it to pursue other interests such as collective 
forms of life). 
 46. See Christian Erni & Marianne Jensen, Implementation of the Right of Self-
Determination of Indigenous Peoples, INDIGENOUS AFF., no. 3, 2001, at 18 
(referring to the Human Rights Committee’s considerations of the fourth periodic 
report of Canada on implementation of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights). 
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to indigenous communities, as comprising the communal use of 
territories and resources as well as the right to cultural autonomy and 
consultation regarding traditional practices.47 Likewise, collective 
expressions of the right to culture are recognized in several 
international instruments and in the decisions of international 
courts.48 While not all of these instruments are binding, they reflect 
the understanding that in societies like ours, often comprising of 
social and economic inequalities and diversity based on ethnic 
backgrounds and cultures, the enjoyment of individual rights is 
almost illusory without the recognition of collective identities and 
rights.49 Overall, even without relying on arguments claiming 
 
 47. See Elsa Stamatopoulou, Taking Cultural Rights Seriously: The Vision of 
the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, in REFLECTIONS ON THE 
UN DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, supra note 3, at 387, 
397 (referring to General Comment No. 23, CCPR/C/21/rev.1/Add.5 and several 
decisions of the Human Rights committee under the Optional Protocol to the 
ICCPR). 
 48. See, e.g., United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
Advisory Opinion (May 2007); see also United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization [UNESCO], Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, 
Nov. 2, 2001, 41 I.L.M. 57 (2002) [hereinafter Declaration on Cultural Diversity]; 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janiero, 
Braz., June 3–14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), Annex I (Aug. 12, 1992) (acknowledging the 
special relationship between Indigenous Peoples and their land and the importance 
of them having control over it and its resources, as well as their involvement in 
development projects); Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National 
or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities arts. 2–3, G.A. Res. 47/135, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/47/135 (Dec. 18, 1992) (referring mainly to individual rights but also 
protecting the cultural and collective identity of the group); ILO, Convention 
Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, art. 2, June 
27, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1382 (1989) (declaring that governments should respect social 
and cultural identities, institutions, and traditions); African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, June 21, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217 (1988). The African Charter 
has several references to collective rights and the African Commission on Human 
Rights has issued an Advisory Opinion of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights on the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples. Id.; Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. Aug. 12, 2008), available at 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_185_ing.pdf; Mayagna 
(Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, 
Judgment (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. Aug. 31, 2001), available at 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_79_ing.pdf. 
 49. See Stavenhagen, Indigenous Rights: Some Conceptual Problems, supra 
note 2, at 152 (arguing that collective rights are required for individuals within 
those collectives to exercise their rights). 
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customary legal status of some principles of the Declaration,50 it is 
undeniable that the Declaration constitutes a strong political and 
moral compromise that is quickly developing binding standards 
through its incorporation into legislation and decisions of national 
and international organisms.51 
As expressed by Jürgen Habermas, rights are asserted from an 
individual perspective only in the legal discourse and in courts.52 In 
the political sphere, where the relevant distribution of goods and 
opportunities are decided, people participate as collective actors, 
identifying themselves as belonging to particular groups with 
common goals.53 More often than not, either because of their 
ethnicity or minority status, society marginalizes some of these 
groups. For these individuals, there cannot be real equality unless the 
collective identity of the group is also recognized and protected 
along with their individual rights.54 However, real equality does not 
exist simply by recognizing an individual right to express one’s 
culture or identity within a group. It has to be complemented with the 
recognition of the group as a right holder in a way that equally 
promotes both the experiences of group members, and each person’s 
 
 50. See, e.g., Anaya, supra note 42, at 6 (arguing that the combination of text in 
international treaties and customary practice is what creates the right to self-
determination); see also Clive Baldwin & Cynthia Morel, Using the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in Litigation, in 
REFLECTIONS ON THE UN DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, 
supra note 3, at 121, 123 (claiming that the overwhelming support for the 
Declaration with 143 states voting in favor and only four states dissenting provides 
evidence of customary international law). 
 51. See, e.g., Luis Rodriguez-Pinero, The Inter-American System and the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Mutual Reinforcement, in 
REFLECTIONS ON THE UN DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, 
supra note 3, at 457, 466–71 (stating how the Declaration is a major authoritative 
source of interpretation of the American Convention and how it influenced the 
decision of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the case of Saramaka v. 
Suriname); see also Stavenhagen, Making the Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples Work: The Challenges Ahead, supra note 18, at 154 (referring 
to the cases of Bolivia, Japan, Canada, and Belize, where national legislation or 
national courts implemented the Declaration). 
 52. HABERMAS, supra note 33, at 204. 
 53. Id. at 203. 
 54. See id. at 205 (referring to Amy Gutmann’s analysis that public recognition 
as equal citizens requires both, respect for the unique identity of each individual, 
regardless of gender, race, or ethnicity, and the respect for the traditions of 
disadvantaged groups). 
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individual rights.55 Only if the group survives and has the opportunity 
to thrive will its members, who want to remain members and whose 
complete identity is defined in relation to the group, be able to enjoy 
their individual rights.  
B. THE SCOPE OF THE COLLECTIVE RIGHTS  
TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND CULTURE 
While collective rights are fundamental in protecting members of 
a group from discrimination by the larger society, collective rights 
can also lead to abuse by the group over its individual members. 
Thus, it is important to define the collective rights to self-
determination and to culture. First, collective rights are human rights 
and, therefore, the same obligations are imposed on the State as those 
defined for individual rights: an obligation to respect, protect and 
fulfill.56 The obligation to respect requires that the State not infringe 
on the enjoyment of human rights; the obligation to protect provides 
that the State guard against infringement of these rights by third 
parties; and lastly, the obligation to fulfill requires positive actions 
on the part of the State to promote these rights.57 Overall, States must 
 
 55. See Stavenhagen, Making the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples Work: The Challenges Ahead, supra note 18, at 18 (citing Article 2 of the 
Declaration as requiring the recognition of equal rights for both indigenous groups 
and individual members, but noting that this has not been addressed); see also 
Stavenhagen, Indigenous Rights: Some Conceptual Problems, supra note 2, at 152 
(noting practices of female genital mutilation as an example of the conflict 
between collective rights and individual rights). 
 56. See The Foundation of International Human Rights Law, UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/hr_law.shtml (last visited Mar. 12, 2013) 
(recounting the history and development of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and subsequent human rights instruments). 
 57. “Respect, Fulfill, and Protect” are the three levels of obligations that, in the 
language of the U.N., describe what International Human Rights Law demands 
from States. In this sense, the three level obligations have been used to define the 
obligations of States in relation to different rights, both, civil and political, and 
economic, cultural, and social. See United Nations, Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. 
on Econ., Soc., & Cultural Rights, The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of 
Health, art. 12, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (2000) (providing the right to the highest 
attainable standard of health); see also UNITED NATIONS FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., 
THE RIGHT TO ADEQUATE FOOD IN EMERGENCIES (FAO Leg. Study No. 77), 2003, 
at 24 (referring to the scope of the obligation of states in relation with the right to 
food); International Human Rights Law, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF THE HIGH 
COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/Pages/ 
InternationalLaw.aspx (last visited Mar. 12, 2013) (using “respect, fulfill, and 
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abide by the jus cogens prohibition of discriminating against 
individuals on the basis of “race, color, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or 
other status.”58 This prohibition draws from the basic understanding 
that human rights are universal since they derive from the inherent 
human dignity and equality of all human beings.59  
Yet, recognizing that collective rights are human rights means 
understanding that, as all human rights that are non-derogable, they 
are not without limits. In this sense, States can legally impose 
restrictions on human rights as long as they are justified with a 
legitimate goal; namely, the protection of national security, public 
safety, public health and morals, or the rights of others.60 These 
human rights restrictions, however, must be established by law, must 
be necessary in a democratic society, and proportionate to the 
fulfillment of the legitimate goal.61 Thus, human rights law already 
admits that the rights of others can be a legitimate reason for 
curtailing some rights when they are in conflict.62 It is with this 
 
protect” to define the general obligation imposed on states by International Human 
Rights Law); The Human Rights-Based Approach, UNITED NATIONS POPULATION 
FUND, http://www.unfpa.org/rights/approaches.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2013) 
(United Nations Fund for Population Activities); Obligations of States Parties 
Under the Convention, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/disabilities/ 
default.asp?id=17 (last visited Mar. 12, 2013) (describing the rights of persons 
with disabilities). 
 58. ICCPR, supra note 29, art. 2. 
 59. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/217 (III) (Dec. 10, 1948) (declaring that all individuals are entitled to 
equal treatment and enjoyment of the same rights, including the right to freedom of 
association, participation in the political process, and a nationality). 
 60. The standards for the restriction of rights are established in the ICCPR 
(e.g., articles 12, 18, 19, 21, 22), the American Convention on Human Rights (e.g., 
articles 12.3, 13, 15, 16, 22, 30), the European Convention of Human Rights (e.g., 
articles 9, 10, 11, 17–18), and further developed by the Inter-American Court and 
the European Court of Human Rights. Organization of American States, American 
Convention on Human Rights arts. 12.3, 13–16, 22, 30, 32, Nov. 22, 1969, 
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter ACHR]; ICCPR, supra note 
29, arts. 12, 18–19, 21–22; European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms arts. 9–11, 17–18, 62, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 
U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention]. 
 61. See, e.g., ACHR, supra note 60, art. 13.2 (stating conditions under which a 
State may impose limits on freedom of thought and expression); European 
Convention, supra note 60, art. 10.2 (providing the requirements for restricting the 
right to freedom of religion or beliefs). 
 62. See Xanthaki, supra note 3, at 429 (explaining that when rights conflict, the 
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approach that a conflict between the collective right to culture of an 
indigenous community and the individual rights of women that may 
be affected by discriminatory practices needs to be analyzed rather 
than by assigning to a predetermined hierarchy to individual rights.63  
However, rights cannot be restricted in ways that have the effect of 
denying the main aim of protection of that right, otherwise it is not 
proportionate. It is important then to understand the main goal of 
collective rights, especially that of the collective right to self-
determination, before assessing how to balance them against 
individual rights. As discussed above, groups are recognized as 
rights holders because this recognition is necessary to promote and 
protect the individual rights of its members,64 but this does not mean 
that the group cannot restrict individual rights, as liberal theories like 
Kymlicka’s argue. It should also not mean that individual rights 
always trump collective ones. If the group has a collective 
prerogative to self-determine its ways of life, there must be some 
restrictions on individual rights that are legitimate. Consequently, not 
every cultural practice of an indigenous community that restricts 
individuals’ rights should be considered illegitimate per se.65 A 
deeper analysis of the justifications and effects of that cultural 
practice should be taken into account.  
At the same time, the right to culture, either in its individual or in 
its collective sphere, does not mean a right to maintain cultural 
practices unchanged. Indeed, the Declaration views indigenous 
cultures as evolving and open to change, both as a result of the 
internal exercise of self-determination, and as a result of external 
influences.66 Changes in cultural traditions are not necessarily 
 
human rights law approach is to “accommodate” those rights, thus emphasizing 
that one law does not trump another unless the law is non-derogable). 
 63. See NEWMAN, supra note 22, at 86 (referring to James Anaya position 
regarding how conflicts between collective rights and individual rights should be 
sorted out by a balance between the competing rights). 
 64. See Stavenhagen, Indigenous Rights: Some Conceptual Problems, supra 
note 2, at 152 (arguing that full recognition of individual rights is only possible 
with the recognition of collective rights, and noting that international human rights 
agreements first provide for collective rights, which provide the foundation for 
individual rights). 
 65. See Xanthaki, supra note 3, at 429 (referring to Parekh theory of contextual 
justice). 
 66. See id. at 426 (noting that the combination of outside influences and 
recognition of change by the Declaration allows for individual members of the 
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negative, and the right to culture is not designed to prevent change. 
The objective of the right to culture is to guarantee the ability to self-
define cultural practices and to protect against forced or unwarranted 
assimilations. Even though Habermas does not support collective 
rights in general, his opinion on this point is pertinent: “[T]he 
ecological perspective on species conservation cannot be transferred 
to cultures.”67 Thus, the Declaration establishes the State’s obligation 
not to subject Indigenous Peoples to forced assimilation or 
destruction of their culture, along with several positive obligations to 
protect and fulfill those rights, mainly through the prohibition of 
discrimination and by providing appropriate redress.68 Yet, the 
Declaration does not say that the State has the obligation to prevent 
changes in cultural practices or to guarantee their survival. Admitting 
this would mean stripping the members of the group from their rights 
to criticize and to decide the traditions by which they want to be 
bound.69 Each culture must allow the interchange of ideas and 
criticism of its foundations because, on one hand, this is implicit in 
the rights of political participation and freedom of expression that are 
fundamental to human rights tradition, and, on the other hand, 
because it must enable future generations to change the cultural 
practices with which they do not agree.70 These rights that can lead to 
change within the group are also rights that the State is obliged to 
ensure.  
Thus, just as this paper argued before against theories that claim 
that individual rights always trump collective rights when addressing 
cultural practices that result in gender inequalities, it argues against 
opinions stating that all indigenous cultural practices are protected 
and that all attempts to change those practices are illegitimate 
 
group to make informed decisions about potential changes that could be made 
within the group). 
 67. Jürgen HABERMAS, supra note 33, at 222. 
 68. See Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 1, arts. 8–
9. On the obligation to fulfill, see article 11 (providing redress through effective 
mechanisms including the restitution of cultural property), article 12 (enabling the 
access and repatriation of ceremonial objects and human remains), article 13 
(ensuring transmission of language, history, oral traditions and participation in 
public proceedings), and article 14 (ensuring children’s access to education 
accordant with traditions and language); on the obligation to protect, see article 15 
(taking effective measures to combat prejudice and eliminate discrimination). 
 69. HABERMAS, supra note 33, at 222. 
 70. Id. 
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interferences.71 The issue is not then whether Indigenous Peoples’ 
cultural practices that unequally affect women’s capacity to enjoy 
their rights should be changed (since if they are discriminatory they 
must be) but rather how the change should be made. This is where 
self-determination takes center stage. 
While the collective right to culture is recognized for many ethnic 
and minority groups, the status of “peoples” and the collective right 
to self-determination has, until now, been exclusively applied to 
Indigenous Peoples.72 The recognition of a right to self-determination 
for Indigenous Peoples is related to the theme of redress of the 
Declaration, which recognizes that many of the historic injustices 
suffered by indigenous groups have strong grounds in colonialism.73 
In accordance with the ICCPR, the ICECSR, and the Declaration, the 
right to self-determination recognizes the ability of Indigenous 
Peoples to freely determine their political status and freely pursue 
their economic, social, and cultural development.74 This implies their 
right to self-government in matters relating to internal affairs.75 In 
this sense, self-determination comprises all the other human rights, 
collective and individual, and it is the standard by which all rights 
need to be assessed.76 Thus, the right to self-determination implies an 
ongoing process through which the community defines the different 
aspects of its ways of life.77 This important right imposes restrictions 
 
 71. See GENDER AND INDIGENOUS WOMEN, supra note 7, at 2. 
 72. See Anaya, supra note 42, at 5, 13 (noting that although “peoples” is a 
broad, flexible term, the right to self-determination predominantly applies to 
Indigenous People because the right is in part historically based on decolonization, 
which characteristically applies to many indigenous groups). Please note, however, 
that many scholars claim that a right to culture is a customary international norm 
applicable to other groups. See, e.g., id. at 6. 
 73. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 1, pmbl. 
(providing expressly that the Declaration is concerned with past injustices suffered 
by indigenous peoples); accord Allen, supra note 20, at 237. 
 74. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 1, art. 3; 
ICCPR, supra note 29, art. 1; ICESCR, supra note 30, art. 1. 
 75. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 1, art. 4; see 
also Anaya, supra note 42, at 9 (“In essence, self-determination comprises a 
standard of governmental legitimacy within the modern human rights frame.”). 
 76. Stavenhagen, Making the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
Work: The Challenges Ahead, supra note 18, at 163; see also Anaya, supra note 
42, at 9 (agreeing that self-determination includes many human rights). 
 77. Stavenhagen, Making the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
Work: The Challenges Ahead, supra note 18, at 163. 
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on the way the conflict of collective and individual rights should be 
analyzed since Indigenous Peoples have sovereignty that predates 
and, at least to some extent, trumps the sovereignty of the State78  
III. ADDRESSING GENDER INEQUALITY  
WITHIN INDIGENOUS COMMUNITIES 
The conclusions reached above are instrumental to addressing 
gender inequality within indigenous communities. As affirmed 
above, Indigenous Peoples have a collective right to self-
determination and culture, which signifies that they are free to 
choose, as a group, their political, economic, and cultural 
organization. Also mentioned above, collective rights must be 
interpreted in a way that generally promote the individual rights of 
the members of the group,79 keeping in mind, however, that a right to 
culture is not a right to maintain cultural practices unchanged.80  
All these standards emerge directly from the Declaration; 
however, they are stated in a gender-neutral form. As a result, many 
indigenous communities enforce cultural practices, including the 
management and control of collective resources, which prevent 
women from enjoying their individual and collective rights of 
equality with men. The issue then is whether the collective right to 
self-determination and culture justifies the enforcement, by the 
community, of these cultural practices on the female members who 
do not want to exit the group. The truth is that while the Declaration 
appropriately defines Indigenous Peoples’ rights to target the 
profound discrimination that indigenous individuals suffer from the 
larger society, it does not appropriately describe the targeted 
discrimination within the community. In fact, these discriminatory 
cultural practices are arguably the result of the exercise of a 
collective right to culture that is protected in the Declaration; 
therefore, challenging those practices on the basis that they go 
 
 78. Allen, supra note 20, at 237 (referring to the statements of James Anaya as 
UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples where he claimed 
Indigenous Peoples’ “‘sovereignty’ . . . predates and . . . should trump the 
sovereignty of the states that now assert power over them.”). 
 79. Stavenhagen, Indigenous Rights: Some Conceptual Problems, supra note 2, 
at 152. 
 80. See HABERMAS, supra note 33, at 222 (arguing that group members must 
be allowed to critique their traditions and practices if the group itself is to survive). 
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against standards of gender equality seems rather contradictory when 
those standards are not part of that group’s culture. This section 
explores this contradiction and lays a foundation on how the 
contradiction should be addressed in a manner that upholds women’s 
rights and collective rights to self-determination and culture.  
First, it should be noted that this contradiction does not seem 
problematic when the cultural practices of an indigenous community 
involve violence against women in a way that, for example, could 
make the practice fit within the definition of a crime under domestic 
criminal law.81 Such is the case, for instance, with female genital 
mutilation (“FGM”).82 In this case, it is rarely even discussed that 
international human rights law trumps any alleged right to enforce 
these cultural practices. Although it may be argued whether 
prohibiting or criminalizing these practices is the best method to 
eliminate them, there is already general agreement that these 
practices should be eliminated. This approach of prohibiting cultural 
practices that involve violence against women has been supported by 
the CEDAW Committee and the General Assembly of the UN.83 
These cultural practices are rejected because they do not promote the 
individual rights of the members of the group and are not protected 
by human rights laws.84 The international community has determined 
that it is intolerant of these cultural practices, and, in general, this has 
not been perceived as an unlawful cultural imposition.  
However, the same determination does not extend to cultural 
practices that do not harm the physical integrity of women or to 
practices where the harm is more “debatable,” such as the lack of 
political participation of indigenous women, or the unequal control 
 
 81. Cf. OSIATYNSKI, supra note 23, at 182 (explaining that some cultural 
practices, like violence against women, will not change without new or altered 
laws banning the practices). 
 82. See Stavenhagen, Indigenous Rights: Some Conceptual Problems, supra 
note 2, at 152 (stating that collective practices like FGM that violate individual 
members’ rights cannot be considered a human right). 
 83. See Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women, 11th sess., Jan. 20–30, 1992, ¶ 24, U.N. Doc. A/47/38(SUPP) (1993); 
Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 9th 
sess., Jan. 22–Feb. 2, 1990, ¶ 438, U.N. Doc. A/45/38(SUPP) (1990); G.A. Res. 
48/104, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/84/104 (Dec. 20, 1993). 
 84. OSIATYNSKI, supra note 23, at 182; Stavenhagen, Indigenous Rights: Some 
Conceptual Problems, supra note 2, at 152. 
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over economic resources.85 The different treatment of these situations 
is not often analyzed, arguably because they evidence cultural 
patterns of the larger society, and because, from the point of view of 
those defending Indigenous Peoples’ rights, they evidence 
contradictions in the system that could debilitate the already weak 
position of indigenous culture. Although there is an undeniable 
difference of degree and reversibility in these practices that justifies a 
differentiated treatment,86 some comprehensive approach should be 
enforced because, in fact, the underlying justifications of both types 
of practices are probably related. The fact that the harm of FGM 
seems more blatant to the international community does not signify 
that other “less harmful” practices should be defended, or even 
tolerated. The degree of harm and reversibility should not only be 
measured in the individual women “victimized” by the practice, but 
also in its collective impact and its effect on the distribution of power 
and opportunities within the community.  
The main problem with those cultural practices that do not 
represent a physical threat to women, but that are still discriminatory, 
is that they are often presented as the last standing indigenous 
traditions. Hence, criticizing them or advocating for their change is 
perceived as a threat to Indigenous Peoples’ survival. This holds true 
even when the challenge is made with the upmost respect for their 
rights as a group. Indigenous communities, including the women 
within them, often recognize the women as the repositories of 
traditional customs. This has often had the effect that traditional 
norms have a larger impact on women’s roles.87 As a consequence, 
while many of these traditions are specially guarded from 
 
 85. Cf. GENDER AND INDIGENOUS WOMEN, supra note 7, at 2 (“[T] here has 
been a tendency to consider the relationships between men and women, and 
women’s situation in general within these societies and communities as part of 
their customary way of living, as something pertaining to their culture and hence 
not up for discussion. This has even included certain practices that were clearly 
discriminatory and even oppressive to women.”). 
 86. See OSIATYNSKI, supra note 23, at 182 (explaining that more reversible 
harms or practices, like veils worn by Muslim women, are harder to condemn than 
irreversible ones, such as female genital mutilation). 
 87. See GENDER AND INDIGENOUS WOMEN, supra note 7, at 8; see also U.N. 
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ADVISOR ON GENDER ISSUES AND ADVANCEMENT OF 
WOMEN & THE SECRETARIAT OF THE U.N. PERMANENT FORUM ON INDIGENOUS 
ISSUES, GENDER AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ CULTURE (Briefing Note No. 4), Feb. 
2010, at 2 [hereinafter GENDER AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ CULTURE]. 
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interferences,88 other traditions that affect men are less discussed. At 
the same time, effects of development and external factors have 
already modified many of the traditional roles of men; for example 
the introduction of cash, in many cases, has forced men to leave their 
traditional hunting or fishing activities to assimilate into the regular 
working force of a larger society.89 Conversely, many of the 
traditions that are related to the private sphere of indigenous life are 
less affected, and, since traditional roles of women are often related 
to the household and family, these are some of the traditions that 
have managed to survive.90 While not all of these traditions are 
discriminatory, some are, and the practices are less visible and more 
protected.91 
 As with the example of the Sukiri community, indigenous 
women’s rights are often limited when compared to those of men. In 
many communities, men control the access and use of the collective 
land and in communities where private ownership has been 
introduced, women do not own or inherit land.92 Also, the traditional 
division of roles often has a disparate impact on women’s health and 
 
 88. See GENDER AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ CULTURE, supra note 87, at 2 
(explaining that indigenous women are seen as the upholders of the cultural 
traditions of the community, and noting that this role is more important within the 
community than gender equality concerns). 
 89. See GENDER AND INDIGENOUS WOMEN, supra note 7, at 13 (noting that in 
Kenya the introduction of cash ruined the barter system and with it the ability of 
Maasai women to access resources). 
 90. Cf. Okin, supra note 13, at 665–66 (explaining that the private sphere 
within the community for indigenous women is often neglected by advocates of 
multiculturalism when assessing the relationship between collective and individual 
rights). 
 91. See id. (arguing that not all inequalities are public since some exist 
informally and in the private sphere of the home). 
 92. See GENDER AND INDIGENOUS WOMEN, supra note 7, at 12 (noting that 
outside influences on the community can be positive on one gender and not the 
other, and explaining that these shifts have devalued some positions within the 
community, such as the woman’s role in the home); see also ESA, supra note 4, at 
66 (referring to studies conducted about how women in indigenous communities 
have unlimited access to resources, but have no control over the resources that 
belong to them since it is men who have the ability to decide over them); 
Wessendorf, supra note 6, at 5 (referring to Twa women in the Great Lakes region 
who have seen their rights to land weakened by individual property rights systems 
where men are the primary landowners, and discussing the prohibition of female 
land inheritance in Nepal). 
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prospects of receiving an education.93 Additionally, in many cases, 
even if women have important control over the household, it is men 
who are perceived as the “head of the house.” Men’s control over the 
household affects women’s freedom of movement (since women 
often have to ask for men’s permission to leave the village), and 
women’s participation in political and social organizations (since 
men often see women’s organizations as a potential threat to their 
social hierarchy).94  
Overall, in many communities, women often do not participate in 
making decisions for the community.95 In the private sphere, their 
ability to decide may be curtailed because they have no authority 
over whom to marry, the number and spacing of their children, or 
whether they are in a monogamous marriage.96 In the public sphere, 
women are not often part of the formal decision-making bodies, 
which usually consist of elderly men.97 Certainly, many of these 
traditions result from the incorporation of western cultural practices 
and the accommodation, often forced, to modern economy.98 
However, despite what some scholars claim, this does not render the 
question of gender inequality in indigenous cultures irrelevant to 
indigenous women.99 In many cases, the group has incorporated these 
practices as its own practice and perceive them as binding. 
As long as these practices discriminate against women, they are in 
 
 93. GENDER AND INDIGENOUS WOMEN, supra note 7, at 11–12 (commenting on 
how workload, lack of mobility, early marriages, circumcisions, pregnancies, and 
lack of resources disproportionately affect women’s ability to obtain an education 
in some indigenous cultures). 
 94. See ESA, supra note 4, at 72 (reporting that women’s movement is 
restricted outside of the community and at times during menstruation within the 
village); see also GENDER AND INDIGENOUS WOMEN, supra note 7, at 13 
(describing the similar restrictive experiences of indigenous women in Guatemala). 
 95. See GENDER AND INDIGENOUS WOMEN, supra note 7, at 13 (providing that 
the lack of female decision-making participation can be attributed in part to 
restraints on a woman’s time and a lack of education). 
 96. See id. 
 97. See id.; see also ESA, supra note 4, at 71 (describing a few examples of 
indigenous groups in which women have little to no representation in formal 
decision-making). 
 98. See GENDER AND INDIGENOUS WOMEN, supra note 7, at 2 (noting the 
disproportionate impact that outside influence has on the different genders within 
an indigenous community); see also Xanthaki, supra note 3, at 427. 
 99. See Xanthaki, supra note 3, at 422 (describing the notion that gender 
inequality is a Western idea and not relevant within indigenous communities). 
  
1078 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [28:4 
violation of fundamental human rights standards that the State is 
internationally bound to respect, fulfill and protect.100 The State 
continues to be bound by these obligations even when these women 
belong to an indigenous community that has a right to self-
determination. It would be odd for international law to obligate the 
States that have ratified CEDAW to eliminate all cultural practices 
that are harmful to women, but to excuse indigenous cultural 
practices of that State because of the indigenous group’s right to self-
determination.101 Similarly, it seems odd to applaud the Inter-
American Commission of Human Rights for obligating the State of 
Guatemala to change laws that contravene the American Convention 
because they rely on negative stereotypes of women that constitute 
an illegitimate discrimination, but to protect indigenous cultural 
practices without any regard to whether the practices are 
perpetuating gender inequality.102 This does not mean that every 
practice that would be deemed discriminatory in western societies 
needs to be considered discriminatory when practiced by an 
indigenous community. For instance, the stereotypes common in 
western societies that often characterize women as caregivers and 
men as breadwinners are arguably discriminatory because of the 
value society gives to the different roles, and not because there is an 
intrinsic negative characteristic of this division. The same division 
could not be discriminatory in an indigenous community when it is 
justified by different reasons. If recognizing diversity means 
anything, conclusions cannot be just extrapolated from one culture to 
the other without a careful case-by-case analysis.  
Equality does demand, however, that women have equal 
opportunities to define their own roles and be allowed to challenge 
them, and the frequent lack of political participation of indigenous 
women in the self-determination process may be evidence that these 
 
 100. See CEDAW, supra note 30, arts. 1–2 (defining discrimination against 
women and requiring States Parties to actively work on eliminating such 
discrimination). 
 101. See id. art. 5 (“States Parties shall take all appropriate measures: (a) To 
modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view 
to achieving the elimination of prejudice and customary and all other practices 
which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the 
sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women.”). 
 102. See Morales de Sierra v. Guatemala, Case 11.625, Inter-Am. Comm’n 
H.R., Report No. 4/00, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.111, doc. 20 rev. ¶ 35–36 (2008). 
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women are denied this opportunity. The construction of individual 
identities is more related to social dialogue and recognition than to 
autonomous choices.103 Therefore, a meaningful participation of each 
person in that social dialogue is fundamental if there is an aim for an 
equal outcome.  
While this is exactly the reasoning that lies beneath 
multiculturalistic approaches supporting inclusive political 
participation of the different cultures and ethnic groups in the larger 
society, how this dialogue should work within the group is not often 
addressed. This is especially important with respect to gender issues. 
If there has been a fundamental triumph of the feminist movement it 
is its incorporation into the larger human rights movement, and, 
among the remarkable achievements of the human rights movement, 
a key one has been submitting gender discrimination to a high 
burden of proof to be conceived as legitimate.104 Thus, we either 
agree that women’s indigenous rights are different, or we extend the 
same strict scrutiny to some of these cultural practices that can be 
discriminatory. Differences should be embraced and culture can be 
relative, but the international community, including Indigenous 
Peoples, has agreed that human rights are not.105 
None of the claims of this essay is foreign to indigenous women. 
Many indigenous women’s organizations have made the demand for 
a change of discriminatory cultural practices, and the demand is 
present in the agenda of indigenous organizations in general.106 In the 
 
 103. See Richard T. Ford, Beyond “Difference”: A Reluctant Critique of Legal 
Identity Politics, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 38, 60 (Wendy Brown & Janet 
Halley eds., 2002) (referring to Charles Taylor’s understanding of identity 
constructions and recognition). 
 104. See, e.g., Morales de Sierra, Case 11.625, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., ¶ 36 
(finding that “very weighty reasons would have to be put forward” to justify a 
distinction based solely on the ground of sex”). 
 105. See Stamatopoulou, supra note 47, at 402–03 (“The duties that an 
indigenous community would require of its members must comply with 
international human rights standards. It is well know that indigenous leaders who 
participated in the negotiations at the United Nations during the drafting of the 
Declaration over the years were well aware of and agreed to this principle early 
on.”). 
 106. See ELLEN-ROSE KAMBEL, FOREST PEOPLES PROGRAMME, A GUIDE TO 
INDIGENOUS WOMEN’S RIGHTS UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE 
ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN (2004), 
available at http://www.hrea.org/erc/Library/display_doc.php?url=http%3A%2F% 
  
1080 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [28:4 
1995 Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, indigenous 
women’s organizations approved a declaration that calls for the 
eradication of indigenous laws, customs, and traditions that are 
discriminatory toward women107 and that demands equal political 
participation in the indigenous and modern socio-political 
structures.108 Latin-American indigenous women made similar 
statements in a 1997 conference celebrated in Mexico,109 as did 
Indian Tribal Women in a Conference in 1998,110 and Asian 
Indigenous women.111 In all these statements indigenous women 
have acknowledged that some traditional practices oppress them, that 
they want them changed, and that they want to be the force of that 
change. At the same time, some UN organs have also considered this 
 
2Fwww.forestpeoples.org%2Fdocuments%2Flaw_hr%2Fcedaw_guide_jan04_eng.
pdf&external=N; GENDER AND INDIGENOUS WOMEN, supra note 7; NATIVE 
WOMEN’S ASS’N OF CAN., ABORIGINAL WOMEN AND SELF-DETERMINATION 
(2007), available at www.laa.gov.nl.ca/laa/naws/pdf/nwac-determination.pdf; 
Indigenous Women, ASIAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLES PACT, http://www.aippnet.org/ 
home/indigenous-women (last visited Mar. 12, 2013). 
 107. Beijing Declaration of Indigenous Women, NGO Forum, U.N. Fourth 
World Conference on Women, ¶ 36 (Sept. 7, 1995), available at 
http://www.ipcb.org/resolutions/htmls/dec_beijing.html. 
 108. Id. ¶ 44. 
 109. GENDER AND INDIGENOUS WOMEN, supra note 7, at 5 (referring to the 
statements made by Blanca Chancoso, an indigenous women from Ecuador, at the 
Second Continental Meeting of Indigenous Women from the Americas in which 
she stated that “indigenous women wish to be recognized as people with rights, not 
only duties. We need to be seen, within our families and communities, not only as 
cooks and child-bearers, but also as female human beings. This is what we want, 
not to be seen as second class people . . . .”). 
 110. Id. at 9 (quoting a statement made by Indian Tribal Women in a 1998 
Conference: “Whereas codification of customary laws and practices is generally a 
good step for the tribes it is fraught with grave danger for women. There are 
various tribal practices, which adversely affect women like polygyny, exclusion of 
women from property rights[,] non-participation of women in collective decision-
making, etc. Codifying these negative aspects would permanently harm tribal 
women. There is, therefore, a need to re-look into the whole matter to advance the 
interest of women in tribal society.”). 
 111. Xanthaki, supra note 3, at 424 (quoting the Baguio Declaration adopted by 
Asian Indigenous women in the third session of the PFII: “We note with concern 
that some modern changes in our traditional social, cultural and political 
institutions and practices have led to a loss of values and codes and behavior which 
upholds gender-sensitive structures and roles, while accepting our responsibility to 
change other customary laws and practices which oppresses indigenous women. 
We will speak up against abusive treatment of indigenous women in the name of 
custom and traditions.”). 
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important issue. For example, the HRC stated in 2006 that the 
Canadian Indian Act had a discriminatory effect on indigenous 
women and their children in matters of reserve membership and 
matrimony property and mandated the Canadian government amend 
this with the consent of the indigenous community.112 The HRC 
stated that “[b]alancing collective and individual interests on reserves 
to the sole detriment of women is not compatible with the [ICCPR] 
Covenant.”113 Another opportunity, the Permanent Forum on 
Indigenous Issues, emphasized that gender balance must be 
reinstated within indigenous communities in culturally appropriate 
ways.114 Despite these initial efforts, attention has not gone much 
deeper, or, at least, to a more critical examination of how to 
empirically deal with the issue or how to put indigenous women’s 
equality in a priority agenda.  
This insufficient effort to delve into indigenous women’s equality 
within the indigenous community has important negative effects. On 
one hand, many indigenous women’s organizations that support the 
change of traditional practices have been accused of dividing and 
debilitating the indigenous movement, or of being “less 
indigenous.”115 Because indigenous women want to be exactly that—
indigenous, plus women, and probably in that order—this type of 
accusation puts them in a position in which they almost have to 
choose between protecting their culture or fighting for their 
equality.116 Thus, the inclusion of a gender perspective in the 
understanding of collective rights to culture and self-determination is 
 
 112. Id. at 422 (referring to the Concluding Observations of the Human Rights 
Committee on Canada, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/CAN/CO/5 (2006)). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. (referring to the Report of the third session of the Permanent Forum on 
Indigenous Issues). 
 115. See id. at 421 (noting that scholars have shied away from gender equality 
issues in addressing indigenous rights, thinking that the topic works against the 
community); accord GENDER AND INDIGENOUS WOMEN, supra note 7, at 3 (noting 
the opposition indigenous women face in addressing gender inequality, but noting 
their persistence); Wessendorf, supra note 6, at 4 (quoting Jorunn Eikjok, a Sami 
woman: “We were unpopular among our fellow sisters in the wider community for 
bringing in our ethnic and cultural identity as women”). 
 116. But see GENDER AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ CULTURE, supra note 87, at 3 
(challenging the separation of gender equality and the right to culture by arguing 
that women require individual and collective rights for full enjoyment of human 
rights). 
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fundamental not only to address indigenous women’s claims, but 
also to convey the message that this is not a division. Rather, this is 
an empowerment of Indigenous Peoples.  
On the other hand, not strongly addressing this issue, or assuming 
that it is less urgent or independent from the community’s survival, 
enables States to use the pretext of protecting individual rights as an 
excuse to strip Indigenous Peoples from control over their internal 
affairs.117 In this sense, even when recognizing collective rights, the 
approach towards collective and individual rights often embraced 
under human rights standards still draws from the same premises 
relied on by liberal theories that deny collective rights: collective 
rights are recognized, but whenever they conflict with individual 
rights, the latter trumps. This seems to be the approach in the 
Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, stating that “[n]o one 
may invoke cultural diversity to infringe upon human rights 
guaranteed by international law, nor to limit their scope.”118 The UN 
Guidelines on Indigenous Peoples’ Issues similarly states this idea,119 
and it is this incorrect approach that allows the State to justify 
unwarranted interventions in matters that should be the sovereign 
concern of indigenous communities.  
Arguing that individual rights always trump collective rights is 
almost like emptying collective rights of any significant meaning. It 
is like saying that an indigenous community has a right to self-
determine their cultural practices but only as long as it is completely 
in accordance with the majoritarian standards.120 This approach does 
not respect either the collective rights of Indigenous Peoples to self-
determine their ways of life, or the individual rights of indigenous 
individuals to live their culture. Holding that individual rights always 
trump collective rights has the effect of alienating indigenous women 
from their own cultural practices that, even if they might question as 
discriminatory, they perceive as binding and they respect. If 
 
 117. See Xanthaki, supra note 3, at 421 (stating that States invoke the protection 
of individual rights to limit collective rights). 
 118. Declaration on Cultural Diversity, supra note 48, art. 4. 
 119. U.N. DEV. GRP., GUIDELINES ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ ISSUES 14 (Feb. 
2008), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/indigenous/docs/guidelines.pdf. 
 120. See Xanthaki, supra note 3, at 429 (stating that assigning a fixed 
predominance of individual rights over collective rights is a “simplistic solution . . 
. that creates more problems than it solves”). 
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collective rights are always trumped, then the group has no 
autonomy. To avoid this, the decision for change must come from 
within the indigenous community, but never without the involvement 
of indigenous women in this debate. Thus, self-determination cannot 
be gender-neutral.  
If we uphold collective rights, we must admit that individual rights 
do not always trump collective rights. A right to self-government 
inherently means that there is going to be an authority that will 
decide on general rules applicable to everyone who wants to be in the 
community. Hence, as with any other governmental authority, there 
are legitimate general interests that Indigenous Peoples can pursue 
that might have the legitimate effect of limiting the exercise of some 
individual rights.121 However, as with any government and society, 
not all cultural practices and general rules are consistent with 
international human rights. Those that are not consistent with 
international human rights cannot be protected under the pretext that 
they derive from a right to the self-determination. Sovereignty also 
has limits. The international community has agreed that there is a 
minimum homogeneous set of guarantees that derive from the 
dignity and equal respect owed to human beings that limits 
governmental authority. The Declaration recognizes that Indigenous 
Peoples must have full enjoyment, as a collective and as individuals, 
of all human rights as recognized in human rights law.122 While 
skeptics could argue that this understanding already constitutes an 
imposition of western values (since human rights standards have 
been criticized as such), those who strongly believe in the human 
rights cause should respond that it is a commitment, undeniably often 
political, but a pact to peacefully share this world leaving no one 
behind.  
While in theory this seems logical, its practical application is not 
as straight forward. The main vacuum created by the Declaration is 
that while it recognizes Indigenous Peoples’ sovereignty over their 
internal affairs that, to some extent, displaces the sovereignty of the 
State; the Declaration does not define, nor has there been any attempt 
to define, whether this creates any particular obligation on 
Indigenous Peoples to express the right to self-determination in 
 
 121. See NEWMAN, supra note 22, at 24. 
 122. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 1, art. 1. 
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accordance with human rights standards.123 Certainly, Indigenous 
Peoples have agreed to this through their participation in the 
negotiation of the Declaration, but this does not explain how this 
duty should be enforced or how violations should be made 
accountable.124 The international obligations certainly remain within 
the State, but since the right to self-determination imposes on the 
government a degree of deference for the self-governance of the 
community, it arguably debilitates the strength of its accountability. 
This vacuum is understandable. The international obligations 
imposed on legal persons other than States are an intellectual 
challenge to the established human rights theory (although the same 
was originally said of collective rights). More importantly, certainly 
no Indigenous Peoples are in a situation to affront international 
obligations nor are they actually enjoying their self-determination 
right. But the complexity of the issue should not discourage the 
debate.  
Faced with the conflict of individual and collective human rights, 
scholars like James Anaya and Alexandra Xanthaki have claimed 
that the issue is rather simple: It can be correctly addressed through 
the general understanding that rights (that are not derogable) have no 
hierarchy and that an ad-hoc analysis of every case would allow for 
the resolution of the conflict in a way that preserves the core values 
of competing rights.125 Accordingly, States could lawfully restrict the 
exercise of collective cultural rights as long as the restriction is 
established by law, necessary in a democratic society, based in the 
pursuance of a legitimate goal, in this case the protection of 
individual rights of indigenous women, and proportional to 
furthering that goal.126  
 
 123. See, e.g., id. pmbl., art. 3 (lamenting the effects of colonization on 
Indigenous Peoples rights, including the right to self-determination, and obliging 
States to protect these rights while saying nothing about the role or obligations of 
the Indigenous Peoples themselves). 
 124. See Stamatopoulou, supra note 47, at 403 (referring to the duties assumed 
by Indigenous Peoples to uphold human rights). 
 125. NEWMAN, supra note 22, at 86 (referring to James Anaya’s understanding 
that conflicts between collective rights and individual rights are a “non-issue” 
since rights always need to be balanced against competing rights); Xanthaki, supra 
note 3, at 429–30. 
 126. See Xanthaki, supra note 3, at 430; see, e.g., Michaud v. France, App. No. 
12323/11, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 59–60 (2012), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/ 
sites/eng-press/pages/search.aspx?i=003-4177258-4942718 (debating whether the 
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This understanding is accurate but incomplete. It is accurate 
because it does not render collective rights irrelevant and it serves to 
justify, for example, the implementation of legal measures 
criminalizing or otherwise prohibiting FGM, not based on the fact 
that individual rights always trump collective ones, but on the result 
of a proportional and reasonableness balancing test.127 It also serves 
to justify how cases like Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez should 
probably be resolved differently under a human rights approach.128 
Female members of an American Indian tribe in the United States 
brought this case requesting declaratory and injunctive relief for a 
discrimination claim based on a tribal ordinance that denied tribe 
membership to children of female members who married outside the 
tribe, but extended that membership to children of male members 
who married outside the tribe.129 The United States Supreme Court 
decided that American Indian tribes are “[d]istinct, independent 
political communities, retaining their original natural rights in 
matters of local self-government,” and that this ordinance was 
protected by the tribe’s autonomy.130 A balance of rights and 
interests, as described above, in a State that has ratified CEDAW, for 
example, should be resolved differently and such discriminatory 
practice should not be upheld.  
However, the balancing of rights proposed by these scholars is not 
enough to address gender inequality within the indigenous 
 
interference was in accordance with the law or necessary in a democratic society 
and therefore a valid restriction of the applicant’s rights under Article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights); Baena-Ricardo v. Panama, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 72, ¶¶ 146–47 
(Feb. 2, 2001), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/Seriec_ 
61_esp.pdf (deciding whether a Panamanian law regulating the right to assembly 
permissibly restricted that right to protect democracy and constitutional order). 
 127. See Female Genital Mutilation (FGM): Legal Prohibitions Worldwide, 
CTR. FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, http://reproductiverights.org/en/document/ 
female-genital-mutilation-fgm-legal-prohibitions-worldwide (last visited Mar. 12, 
2013) (providing an account of the different legal measures adopted by countries to 
eradicate FGM practices). 
 128. See generally Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 62–63 (1978) 
(explaining that Congress decided to selectively apply constitutional safeguards to 
Indian tribes through the ICRA “to fit the unique political, cultural, and economic 
needs of tribal governments” and thereby protect the tribes’ right to self-
determination). 
 129. Id. at 49. 
 130. Id. at 55. 
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community, since implicit in this assumption is the idea that the State 
has the opportunity to balance rights in concrete cases. For many 
reasons, this has not been the case with discriminatory cultural 
practices of indigenous communities. A majority of the States with 
indigenous populations do not have the legal structure that would 
enable a case like Santa Clara to arise (either because indigenous 
communities do not have the sovereign status that enables them to be 
sued, the issue is not of political concern, or indigenous women are 
not organized in a way that would generate the claim). Even if States 
had the legal structure to hear cases such as Santa Clara, this is 
probably not what indigenous women want since it implies 
challenging the community. Assuming that challenging this 
discrimination can be solved by balancing tests does not give many 
real options to indigenous women. The prohibition of discrimination 
imposes on the State positive obligations that are not limited to 
providing redress. Therefore, along with balancing rights in concrete 
cases, the elimination of discriminatory practices must come as a 
result of a dialogue originated in the community, and supported by 
the implementation of governmental policies and programs. Yet, 
States must ensure indigenous women’s participation in this 
dialogue, or else indigenous women will have no recourse for their 
claims.  
The right to self-determination cannot be applied in a gender-
neutral form. Women must be part of this process, and the State and 
international community must take all permissible measures to make 
sure women can participate by encouraging the dialogue in that 
direction, not in whatever direction the self-determination manifests. 
Also, when international and domestic courts have the opportunity to 
uphold Indigenous Peoples’ collective rights to culture or property 
over their lands and resources, they should incorporate a gender 
perspective in the analysis. The international community has been a 
successful forum through which indigenous women have channeled 
their claims for political participation in the internal affairs and 
control over the community’s economic resources. This claim, 
however, has yet to be endorsed by the international community as a 
violation of a right and not just as an undesirable situation. Without 
the international community’s endorsement, this claim will not have 
much influence within the communities.  
For these reasons, the State has the obligation to guarantee that 
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women are able to freely participate in this debate.131 According to 
Friedman, for individuals within a group to be able to freely make 
decisions they must be able to (1) choose among a significant and 
morally acceptable number of alternatives, (2) make their own 
choices free of coercion, and (3) develop, earlier in their lives, the 
capacities needed to reflect on their situation and make decisions 
about them.132 Measuring these conditions is difficult, but attempting 
to ensure them is what the State must assume as the content of its 
positive obligations.  
It must be asked, however, what happens if the decision reached 
under those premises is to continue enforcing practices that affect 
women’s rights?133 To which we must answer: respect the decision.134 
In fact, different communities can reach different decisions toward 
cultural practices. For example, on cases of rape or wife battering, 
indigenous women from New Caledonia have criticized as 
discriminatory the tradition that the fines imposed on the violator go 
to the community and not to the victim, but indigenous women from 
the Cordillera who felt that this approach increased the gravity of 
rape since it is the whole tribe that feels violated have upheld the 
tradition as legitimate.135 The decisions reached must be respected in 
the same way that women who believe criminalizing abortion is 
discriminatory respect the norms that criminalize it, or in the same 
way that many women criticize many of the cultural practices of 
western communities but respect their source. What is fundamental is 
for the debate and dialogue to exist and be open; thus, at a minimum, 
societies must leave the door open for future generations to change 
aspects of their culture as they choose. A right to culture does not 
mean a right to impede change, and, for those who are not part of any 
indigenous community, but believe that some indigenous cultural 
practices are discriminatory against women, can and should speak 
out and help these changes occur through mutual respect, education 
and empowerment policies.  
 
 131. See Xanthaki, supra note 3, at 425 (citing articles in the Declaration that 
support an individual’s right to make decisions without interference). 
 132. Id. 
 133. See id. at 427. 
 134. See id. at 428 (arguing that the decisions of indigenous groups in the 
application of human rights norms deserve the same deference conferred to states). 
 135. GENDER AND INDIGENOUS WOMEN, supra note 7, at 9. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
This essay presented Indigenous Peoples’ rights and struggles 
through a different perspective, a perspective that is not much 
discussed. The perspective is one that is often perceived as a threat 
to the main issue for Indigenous Peoples: guaranteeing their 
survival and development as a group. It argued that some cultural 
practices of some indigenous communities might likely have the 
same discriminatory effects on indigenous women that some 
cultural practices of some non-indigenous communities have on 
non-indigenous women. Many indigenous women are not allowed 
input in the decision-making processes of their communities, they 
do not own or have power to decide over collective lands and 
resources, and they are affected by menstruation taboos that impede 
their abilities to work and educate themselves in a way that men 
often can. Many of these women have stood up and denounced 
these practices in the same way that women from non-indigenous 
communities have done.  
However, indigenous women face particular obstacles in this 
fight. On one hand, the collective right to self-determination and 
the right to culture can be understood to protect some of these 
practices because they derive from the autonomy of the community. 
On the other hand, the community may resist these claims because 
they are perceived as divisive to the indigenous movement. The 
same perception seems to emerge from the international community 
advocating for Indigenous Peoples’ rights. Not because there is an 
intentional desire to omit gender inequality claims, but because the 
struggle for recognition, the threats of extinction, and the human 
rights abuses indigenous communities face around the world are so 
acute that other needs appear to be more compelling. At the same 
time, the issue presents complex collisions of collective and 
individual rights that have not been deeply analyzed in concrete 
cases, and the issue demands answering fundamental questions, 
such as: What is the purpose of human rights law? How do 
difference and equality interplay? What is the minimum standard of 
tolerance for the differences that human rights admit? It may be that 
we are not yet prepared to address all of these questions. 
Meanwhile, however, indigenous women who appeal for change in 
some aspects of their traditional culture are presented with scarce 
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options: it is often a decision between either supporting indigenous 
life as is or be considered less indigenous when making a claim for 
equality.  
While it is affirmed that collective rights are fundamental human 
rights, which coherent implementation admits the group can validly 
limit the exercise of some individual rights, this cannot mean that 
discriminatory practices can be enforced, and this does not mean that 
any practice western societies consider discriminatory indigenous 
communities must also consider discriminatory. The decision to 
invalidate a tradition must lie with the community, and the State and 
international community must be respectful of the community’s 
autonomy. However, gender equality must be enforced in the 
community’s self-determination process. Indigenous rights, as all 
other human rights, cannot be applied in a gender-neutral form. 
Indigenous women need to have a voice in decision-making 
processes, in the management of resources, and in the representation 
of the group. An open forum is the core value of non-discrimination 
that must be ensured. In the same way that gender discriminatory 
practices are debated and questioned in other communities, they 
should be debated and questioned in indigenous ones. The important 
thing is that they are debated. 
This essay is just that, an essay. It probably did not propose novel 
concepts, nor did it attempt to do so. It probably made some 
assertions that can be questioned, but that is exactly the point. This 
essay attempted to show a complex problem for which, although not 
easy, solutions are available, but are not being argued. Overall, it 
attempted to show how a demand for recognition of women’s 
rights—that of indigenous women to change some discriminatory 
cultural practices of their communities—may be silenced by other 
struggles that are deemed to be more urgent. This, regrettably, is not 
news in humanity’s history. Including gender perspectives as a 
fundamental indigenous issue should be largely supported: not only 
for the discrimination and abuses indigenous women suffer from the 
larger society, but also within their communities. At a minimum, this 
support would certainly empower indigenous communities and 
increase their bargaining power toward the larger society.  
Human rights demand respect of indigenous and non-indigenous 
culture. Yet, this does not mean cultural traditions cannot be 
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questioned. As anthropologist and feminist advocate Diane Bell has 
put it:  
[U]ncomfortable as it may be, if one has a voice, one should speak. The 
issue for me is to find ways of doing this that are grounded in actual 
relationships with the people whose reality is being represented by an 
“outsider.” Thus far this strategy has not been altogether successful, but 
I’m not sure there is any acceptable way of saying women are being 
abused, and for many reasons—conflicts of interest, powerlessness, racial 
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